When Compromise Becomes Standoff: Joint Implementation and the Case of the European Public Prosecutor's Office

This article explores endogenous problems of joint implementation in multi‐level systems. Focusing on the European PublicProsecutor's Office (EPPO), we theorize a causal mechanism of conflict deferral, whereby contentious negotiations are resolvedthrough deliberately ambiguous legislation that postpones conflict to the implementation stage. Under conditions of jointimplementation, where multiple authorities exercise interdependent enforcement powers, such ambiguity produces standoffs:situations of overlapping and incompatible jurisdictional claims over the same implementing action. Empirically, we applytheory‐testing process tracing to two conflicts involving the EPPO: vertical conflicts over competence between EU and nationalauthorities, and horizontal conflicts in cross‐border investigations. Drawing on official documents, case law, and interviews, weshow how legislative compromises locked in unresolved conflicts that systematically resurfaced during implementation. Thearticle advances research on joint implementation by specifying the micro‐mechanisms linking legislative conflict to imple-mentation dysfunctions and by conceptualizing standoff as a distinct implementation outcome in multi‐level governance.

This article was first published in English in Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions on 25 June 2026.

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